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Abstract-As external debt servicing has increased, developing countries have been forced to re-evaluate 
programs in an effort to curtail government spending. This paper attempts to examine the character of 
the sectoral adjustments that have taken place (1961-1982) in the main functional areas of Argentinean 
government expenditures. In general, it appears that social services, particularly education and health 
along with public administration, have borne the brunt of the government's rising debt service problem. 
The social sectors have suffered further due to regime changes, with military regimes tending to cut back 
even more severely allocations to the social sectors than normal debt service constraints would have 
warranted . 
INTRODUCTION 
The economic climate of the 1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s in Argentina has been particularly unstable, 
not only because of adverse developments in world 
markets but because of increased difficulties in stabil-
izing the domestic economy. One of the consequences 
of the country's relative economic stagnation has 
been an increasing difficulty on the part of the 
government to finance its customary budgets. 
As debt service costs have risen and revenue has 
levelled off or declined, the government has been 
forced to re-evaluate programs in an effort to curtail 
government spending. This paper attempts to exam-
ine the character of the sectoral adjustment that has 
taken place in the main functional areas of govern-
ment expenditures [I]. Is there evidence that particu-
lar sectors have suffered as debt service payments 
increased? Were the shifts in political regime particu-
larly important in reordering budgetary priorities in 
light of mounting debt service payments? What are 
the implications for servicing increased levels of debt? 
EMPIRICAL TESTING 
Multiple regressions with Cochrane-Orcutt cor-
rections [2] for serial correlation were performed. The 
share of the budget allocated to each functional 
expenditure type was the dependent variable, with the 
share of debt service an independent variable 
and government expenditures as a percent of gross 
domestic product the control variable. 
After the first set of regressions were run, each 
equation was re-estimated with a political shift 
dummy variable included as a third independent 
variable [3]. 
During the period under examination, four regimes 
governed: 
(1) 1961-1956 period of democracy; 
(2) 1966--1972 first military regime; 
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(3) 1973-1976 Peronist regime; 
(4) 1977-1982 second military regime. 
There is sufficient reason to believe that regime 
type does not have the same meaning over time; i.e. 
the first and second military regimes might in fact 
have few similarities with regard to economic policy, 
with the same to be said for the elected Peronist 
civilian regime (1973-1976) and the non-Peronist 
civilian regime (1961-1965). At least eight different 
representations of the 1961-1982 regime types make 
sense (Table 1) with: 
(1) DUMPB representing the standard civilian 
military dichotomy; 
(2) DUMP depicting structural shifts upwards 
over time between the 1960s regimes to the Peronists 
and finally the second military regime. If DUMP is 
statistically significant, the country would have ex-
perienced two sharp breaks upward in the amount of 
funds allocated to military expenditure during the 
1961-1982 period; 
(3) DUMPA similar to DUMP with three upward 
structural shifts produced with regime changes, i.e. 
increased militarization with regime change; 
(4) DUMPC assuming military regimes in 
Argentina to allocate significantly more resources to 
defense than their civilian counterparts, with the 
Peronists more inclined to increase defense ex-
penditures than their civilian counterparts in the early 
1960s; 
(5) DUMPD similar to DUMPC but with the first 
civilian regime more prone to step up military spend-
ing than the Peronists; 
(6) DUMPE assuming to Peronists least likely to 
give priority to defense, followed by the first civilian 
regime, then the first military regime, with the second 
military regime most heavily increasing military 
spending; 
(7) DUMPF assuming no real change in military 
allocation priorities in the 1960s, a sharp fall off 
under the civilian Peronist regime and a major shift 
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Table I. Argentina, political dummy variables, 1961-1982 
Dummy variable 
Year DUMP DUMP A DUMPB DUMPC DUMPD DUMPE DUMPF DUMPG 
1961 0 ,0 0 0 l 1 1 1 
1962 0 0 0 0 1 I 1 1 
1963 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1964 0 0 0 0 1 1 I 1 
1965 0 0 0 0 I 1. I I 
1966 0 1 I 2 2 2 I 3 
1967 0 I I 2 2 2 1 3 
1968 0 1 1 2 2 2 I 3 
1969 0 I I 2 2 2 I 3 
1970 0 I I 2 2 2 I 3 
1971 0 1 1 2 2 2 I 3 
1972 0 1 I 2 2 2 I 3 
1973 I 2 0 I 0 0 0 0 
1974 I 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1975 I 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1976 2 3 I 2 2 3 2 2 
1971 2 3 1 2 2 3 "' 2 2 
1978 2 3 I 2 2 3 2 2 
1979 2 3 I 2 2 3 2 2 
1980 2 3 I 2 2 j 2 2 
1981 2 3 I 2 2 3 2 2 
1982 2 3 I 2 2 3 2 2 
Note: 1961-1965 period of democracy; 1966-1972 first military regime; 1973-1976 Peronist regime; 1977-1982 second 
military regime. 
Table 2. Argentina: impact of public sector debt service allocations on major budgetary items, 1961-1982 
Government 
expenditures 
as a% of Statistics 
Political Share of gross domestic 
Budgetary item variable debt service product Rho ,2 F ow 
Share of public 
administration (-4.98) (1.06) 0.566 24.04 2.08 
DUMP 
(-1.99) (-2.75) (1.59) (-0.25) 0.721 12.95 2.06 
Share of defense (-1.99) (4.10) 0.173 3.97 1.36 
DUMP A 
(0.86) (-2.15) (3.12) 0.205 3.98 1.57 
DUMPB 
(2.68) (-2.51) (4.36) 0.409 6.23 1.94 
DUMPC 
(2.05) (-2.25) (4.85) 0.327 4.37 1.67 
DUMPD 
(3.05) (-2.70) (3.56) 0.455 7.54 2.07 
DUMPE 
(3.48) (-3.45) (2.90) 0.506 9.24 2.23 
DUMPF 
(5.85) (-5.74) (0.44) 0.703 21.34 2.05 
DUMPG 
(2.51) (-2.29) (4.43) 0.386 5.67 1.84 
DUMPF 
(5.27) (-2.11) (-0.71) (0.65) 0.696 11.50 2.06 
Share of domestic security (-5.22) (12.07) 0.589 27.27 1.36 
(-3.66) (2.10) (2.98) 0.443 7.17 1.26 
DUMPE 
• (2.25) (-3.85) (3.91) (0.97) 0.488 4.77 1.41 
DUMPF 
(3.83) (-4.91) (3.97) (0.22) 0.615 7.99 1.71 
Share of social services (-6.48) (2.40) 0.688 42.00 1.61 
(-5.95) (2.12) (2.20) 0.756 28.02 1.58 
DUMP 
(-2.52) (-6.12) (3.29) (2.74) 0.804 20.54 1.61 
DUMPA 
(-3.44) (-7.19) (4.13) (3.49) 0.819 22.71 1.94 
DUMPB 
(-3.57) (-7.22) (2.78) (2.31) 0.858 30.33 2.06 
DUMPC 
(-2.85) (-7.06) (3.04) (2.73) 0.818 22.53 1.96 
DUMPD 
(-4.12) (-6.99) (2.18) (l.71) 0.889 40.42 2.09 
DUMPE 
(-5.43) (-7.52) (3.05) (1.55) 0.921 58.80 2.28 
DUMPF 
(-6.12) (-6.56) (2.62) (0.88) 0.939 77.10 2.19 
DUMPG 
(-2.80) (-6.66) (1.99) (0.40) 0.838 26.01 1.91 
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as a% of Statistics 
Political Share of gross domestic 
Budgetary item variable debt service product Rho ,2 F ow 
Share of education (-6.43) (2.49) 0.685 41.34 1.69 
DUMP A 
(-5.08) (-6.56) (3.81) (3.08) 0.860 30.75 2.75 
DUMP 
(-4.56) (-5.41) (3.00) (2.07) 0.874 34.80 2.04 
DUMPB 
(-3.31) (-6.13) (3.59) 0.753 27.52 2.00 
DUMPC 
(-2.43) (-5.65) (3.49) 0.703 21.28 2.04 
DUMPD 
(-3.78) (-6.51) (3.57) 0.776 31.21 1.97 
DUMPE 
(-5.40) (-6.86) (3.49) 0.849 50.73 1.88 
DUMPF 
(-6.16) (-7.11) (3.12) 0.869 67.84 1.54 
DUMPG 
(-2.47) (-6.13) (3.50) 0.704 21.44 1.81 
Share of health (-2.59) (16.93) 0.260 6.11 2.19 
(-2.26) (-1.41) (15.39) 0.346 4.77 2.35 
DUMP 
(-7.07) (-4.35) (-1.85) (-1.23) 0.983 305.83 1.98 
DUMP A 
(-5.22) (-6.32) (0.34) 0;923 I08.43 1.98 
Share of social 
security and welfare (-3.53) (13.90) 0.396 12.47 1.79 
(-3.33) (2.84) (3.70) 0.392 5.82 1.71 
DUMP 
(2.00) (-3.26) (1.87) (1.53) 0.478 4.58 1.72 
DUMPF 
(1.45) (-3.35) (3.40) (2.19) 0.432 3.81 1.80 
Share of housing (-1.52) (1.42) (3.15) 0.122 1.25 1.90 
DUMPB 
(-2.11) (-1.53) (1.36) (1.37) 0.307 2.21 2.06 
DUMPC 
(-1.42) (-1.67) (1.63) (2.43) 0.212 1.34 2.05 
DUMPD 
(-4.03) (-1.10) (0.72) (-0.36) 0.569 6.61 1.93 
DUMPE 
(-4.81) (-0.66) (1.09) (-0.93) 0.648 9.21 1.94 
DUMPF 
(-5.71) (0.77) (0.10) (-1.76) 0.719 12.80 1.93 
DUMPG 
(-2.14) (-1.49) (0.90) (l.28) 0.311 2.26 2.03 
Share of other social 
expenditures 
DUMP 
(-2.23) (- 1.01) (1.68) (10.51) 0.286 2.01 1.75 
DUMPA 
(-2.25) (-1.26) (2.03) (9.72) 0.289 2.03 1.97 
DUMPE 
(-I.SI) (-0.53) (1.17) (5.04) (0.208) 1.31 2.24 
DUMPF 
(-1.71) (-0.39) (0.94) (5.64) 0.227 1.47 2.20 
Share of economic development (-4189) (1.14) 0.557 23.91 1.78 
(0.03) (-4.48) (-0.35) 0.867 59.16 2.02 
DUMPB 
(1.65) (-0.01) (-4.77) (-0.17) 0.878 36.14 2.14 
DUMPC 
(I.SI) (0.33) (-4.77) (-0.15) 0.874 34.91 2.18 
DUMPD 
(1.63) (-0.35) (-4.31) (-0.25) 0.882 37.92 2.08 
DUMPE 
(1.48) (-0.44) (-4.45) (-0.27) 0.879 36.40 2.03 
DUMPG 
(1.68) (-0.06) (-4.44) ( -0.21) 0.881 36.93 2.15 
Note: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure of serial correlation correction. 
( ) = I-statistic. 
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Table 3. Argentina: impact of public sector debt service allocations on major budgetary items, 1961-1975 
Government 
expenditures 
as a% of Statistics 
Political Share of gross domestic 
Budgetary item variable debt service product Rho ,2 F ow 
Share of administration public (-1.98) (0.37) 0.247 3.93 2.13 
(-2.05) (1.00) (0.08) 0.299 2.13 2.11 
DUMP 
(1.76) (-2.77) (0.55) 0.416 3.53 2.11 
DUMP A 
(1.70) (-2.62) (-0.25) 0.386 3.14 2.00 
DUMPB 
(-1.47) (-2.65) (2.24) 0.408 3.44 2.25 
DUMPD 
DUMPE 
(-1.58) (-2.77) (1.60) 0.413 3.52 2.21 
DUMPF 
( -1.76) (-2.77) (0.56) 0.416 3.57 2.11 
DUMPG 
(-1.56) (-2.75) (l.89) 0.415 3.54 2.23 
Share of defense 
DUMPB 
(2.02) (0.87) (-2.55) (3.49) 0.541 3.53 1.95 
DUMPC 
(2.40) (1.10) (-3.10) (4.20) 0.574 4.06 1.89 
DUMPD 
DUMPE 
(1.66) (0.65) (-2.01) (2.81) 
DUMPG 
0.522 3.28 1.93 
" 
(1.79) (0.73) (-2.22) (3.05) 0.527 3.35 1.94 
Share of domestic security (-1.96) (0.85) 0.243 3.85 1.53 
(-2.37) (1.28) (0.70) 0.344 2.62 1.33 
DUMP 
(-0.43) (-l.91) (1.21) (0.57) 0.361 1.70 1.17 
Share of total social services (0.72) (0.59) 0.042 0.52 2.32 
(-1.24) (2.68) (0.78) 0.411 3.48 2.19 
DUMP A 
(1.23) (-1.63) (1.16) (0.75) 0.489 2.87 2,28 
DUMPB 
(-1.50) (-1.97) (2.91) (1.23) 0.505 3.06 2.36 
DUMPC 
(-1.47) (-1.97) (3.11) (1.33) 0.498 2.97 2.37 
DUMPD 
DUMPE 
(-1.46) (-1.91) (2.36) (1.08) 0.505 3.06 2.34 ~· 
DUMPF 
(-1.23) (-1.63) (1.16) (0.75) 0.489 2.87 2.28 
DUMPG 
(-1.49) (-1.94) (2.62) (1.14) 0.505 3.07 2.35 .'le 
Share of education (-2.65) (2.43) 0.370 7.07 2.00 
(-2.82) (1.12) (2.21) 0.442 3.65 1.82 
DUMPB 
(-1.83) (-3.35) (2.76) 0.529 5.62 2.45 
DUMPC 
( -1.59) (-3.11) (2.90) 0.503 5.07 2.53 
DUMPD 
DUMPE 
(-1.83) (-3.41) (2.60) 0.524 5.52 2.20 
DUMPF 
• (-1.50) (-3.14) (2.35) 0.474 4.51 1.86 
DUMPG 
(-1.86) (-3.42) (2.67) 0.530 5.64 2.31 
Share of health (-9.66) (-0.45) 0.886 93.33 1.82 
(-5.03) (-3.32) (1.48) 0.881 37.02 1.85 
DUMP 
(-1.45) (-4.25) (-1.02) (-0.80) 0.946 53.49 1.83 
Share of health 
DUMP A 
(-2.37) (-8.48) (0.44) (-2.61) 0.967 88.94 2.14 
DUMP 
(-1.45) (-4.25) (-1.03) (-0.80) 0.946 53.49 1.83 
(-4.64) (-3.28) (2.04) 0.860 18.56 1.74 
Share of social security welfare (1.21) (0.24) 0.110 1.48 1.96 
(-0.30) (1.54) (1.03) 0.219 1.40 1.83 
DUMP 
(0.01) (-0.27) (1.07) (1.03) 0.219 0.84 1.83 
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as a% of Statistics 
Political Share of gross domestic 
Budgetary item variable debt service product Rho ,2 F DW 
Share of housing (3.34) (-1.37) 0.481 11.15 2.19 
(-2.28) (2.71) (3.94) 0.483 4.67 1.51 
DUMP 
(3.21) (-1.08) (-0.56) (-0.83) 0.758 9.41 2.07 
DUMPB 
(-2.61) (-2.46) (3.42) (1.89) 0.651 5.61 1.74 
DUMPC 
(-2.40) (-2.80) (3.77) (3.00) 0.653 5.66 1.73 
DUMPD 
DUMPE 
(-2.88) (-2.10) (2.48) (0.26) 0.671 6.13 1.83 
DUMPF 
(-3.21) (-1.08) (-0.56) (-0.83) 0.758 9.41 2.07 
DUMPG 
(-2.76) (-2.26) (2.92) (1.37) 0.661 5.84 1.79 
Share of other social expenditures (5.56) (0.74) 0.720 30.99 2.02 
(3.40) (1.97) (0.59) 0.804 20.61 2.00 
DUMPA y (1.07) (3.79) (0.19) (-0.13) 0.861 18.65 2.03 
Share of economic development (-6.02) (-0.32) 0.751 36.24 2.33 
(-3.05) (-2.15) (-0.52) 0.834 25.26 2.45 
DUMP A 
(-0.61) (-3.06) (-0.67) (-0.69) 0.846 16.57 2.38 
Note: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure for serial correlation correction. 
( ) = I-statistic. 
Table 4. Argentina: impact of public sector debt service allocations on major budgetary items, 1966-1982 
Government 
expenditures 
as a% of Statistics 
Political Share of gross domestic 
Budgetary item variable debt service product Rho ,2 F DW 
Share of public 
administration (-4.72) (0.85) 0.614 22.28 1.92 
(-3.06) (0.95) (1.17) 0.607 9.28 1.98 
DUMP 
DUMP A 
'z,.• (-2.78) (-2.89) (1.87) (-0.21) 0.838 20.83 1.94 
DUMPF 
(-1.21) (-2.24) (0.64) (0.85) 0.675 8.32 1.96 
Share of defense (-1.74) (3.80) 0.178 3.05 1.34 




(4.99) (-1.82) (1.05) (-0.27) 0.712 9.90 1.77 
DUMPE 
(12.05) (-4.18) (I. 79) (-3.29) 0.932 55.14 1.79 
DUMPF 
(14.30) (-4.96) (1.07) (-3.84) 0.951 72.84 2.36 
DUMP6 
(1.46) (-1.50) (-1.92) (9.35) 0.575 5.43 1.69 




(3.59) (-4.40) (4.25) (-0.47) 0.650 7.44 1.78 
DUMPB 
(4.20) (-4.92) (4.42) (-0.54) 0.704 9.53 1.84 
DUMPF 
(4.02) (-4.89) (4.06) (-0.22) 0.698 9.28 1.83 
DUMP6 
(2.19) (-3.59) (3.35) (0.37) 0.530 4.51 1.69 
Share of total 
social services (-5.39) (1.88) 0.68 29.07 1.57 
(-5.47) (2.47) (2.81) 0.725 15.85 1.61 
DUMP 
DUMP A 




(-5.10) (-5.03) (0.85) (-0.32) 0.947 71.62 1.95 
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as a% of Statistics 
Political Share of gross domestic 
Budgetary item variable debt service product Rho ,1 F DW 
Share of total 
social services 
DUMPE 
(-7.97) (-5.94) (1.77) (-1.06) 0.974 149.91 2.12 
DUMPF 
(-7.97) (-6.28) (2.72) (-0.82) 0.974 151.41 1.84 
DUMPG 
(-2.83) (-4.72) (0.76) (0.67) 0.887 31.42 1.74 
Share of education (-5.34) (2.00) 0.670 28.51 1.69 
(-3.89) (1.27) (3.32) 0.583 8.39 1.99 
DUMP 
DUMPA 




(-3.44) (-3.51) (0.41) (4.80) 0.749 11.96 2.00 
DUMPE 
(-4.90) (-4.22) (0.52) (3.82) 0.850 22.69 1.90 
DUMPF 
(-6.02) (-4.82) (0.83) (3.24) 0.898 35.23 1.80 
DUMPG 
(-2.32) (-3.04) (0.60) (5.84) 0.634 6.94 2.08 
Share of health (-2.47) (12.89) 0.304 6.12 1.66 
(-2.26) (-0.13) (13.20) 0.301 2.59 1.71 
DUMP 
DUMA 




(-0.13) . (-2.38) (12.79) 0.306 2.64 1.63 
DUMPE 
(-0.11) (-2.38) (12.82) 0.305 2.64 1.65 
DUMPF 
(-0.01) (-2.39) (12.76) 0.306 2.64 1.66 
DUMPG 
(-0.91) (-2.17) (16.09) 0.370 2.94 2.16 
Share of social 
security welfare (-3.02) (12.04) 0.395 9.16 1.08 
(-2.63) (2.99) (1.34) 0.409 4.16 1.59 
DUMP 
DUMA 
(2.46) (-3.24) (2.21) (0.31) 0.638 7.06 2.00 
Share of social 
security welfare 
DUMPE 
(1.39) (-3.01) (3.48) (0.85) 0.509 4.14 1.73 
DUMPF 
(1.72) (-3.20) (3.64) (0.65) 0.551 4.89 1.78 
(-0.76) (2.22) 0.04 0.57 1.96 
( -1.52) (1.79) (3.66) 0.21 1.60 1.92 




(-6.89) (1.03) (-1.76) (-2.78) 0.839 20.86 2.10 
DUMPE 
(-6.58) (1.15) (-1.01) (-2.68) 0.827 19.13 2.13 
DUMPF 
(-4.92) (0.60) (-0.09) (-1.64) 0.753 11.00 1.94 
DUMPG 
(-4.39) (0.11) (-1.24) (- 1.31) 0.688 8.83 1.84 
Share of other social 
expenditures (-0.33) (3.63) 0.01 0.11 2.11 
(-1.02) (1.24) (3.20) 0.109 0.74 2.16 
DUMP 
DUMP A 
(-2.25) (-1.24) (1.63) (7.35) 0.367 2.32 1.65 
DUMPE 
(-1.30) (-0.50) (0.74) (3.54) 0.217 I.II 2.20 
DUMPF 
(-1.47) (-0.51) (0.73) (4.10) 0.241 1.27 2.21 
DUMPG 
(-1.32) (-0.47) (0.59) (2.01) 0.244 1.29 2.09 
(continued) 
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as a% of Statistics 
Political Share of gross domestic 
Budgetary item variable debt service product Rho ,2 F DW 
Share of economic 
development (-4.32) (0.64) 0.572 18.72 1.68 




(1.21) (0.19) (-3.88) ( -1.14) 0.924 49.14 1.81 
DUMPG 
(1.24) (0.26) (-3.60) (-1.16) 0.925 49.59 1.88 
Note: Estimations made using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure of serial correlation correction. 
( ) = I-statistic. 
upwards under the second miliatry regime. This 
interpretation is often implicity assumed in the qual-
itative literature; 
(8) DUMPG assuming again the Peronists least 
likely to undertake military expenditures, followed by 
the first civilian regime. It is used to test whether the 
first military regime was more inclined to allocate 
funds to defense purposes than the second military 
regime. 
Only the statistically significant results are given 
here due to space limitations. 
For the period as a whole (Table 2) it appears that: 
(1) The share of the budget allocated to public 
administration had declined to help service the 
government's debt. This tendency has been reinforced 
by a secular trend downward in the share of the 
budget going to public administration, with the shift 
in regimes (but not with changes from military to 
civilian and vice versa); 
(2) The defense share may be weakly affected by 
debt service payments. The r 2 for the debt service 
defense tradeoff is only 0.17 with a t-value less than 
2. Adding the political dummies to the equation 
increases the negative sign of the debt service term. It 
appears that whatever cutbacks have occurred in the 
share of defense in the budget as a result of mounting 
debt service payments have been more than offset by 
shifts to military regimes; 
(3) As with defense, domestic security has con-
tracted as a share of the budget with increased debt 
service payments, only to be offset by shifts to 
military regimes; 
(4) Total social services have been greatly cut back 
with the increase in debt service-the share to debt 
service explaining nearly 70% of the fluctuations in 
the share of total services. Changes in regime have 
reinforced the country's normal tendency to service 
the debt at the expense of social services. The military 
regimes, in particular (DUMPE, DUMPF) have been 
harsh on the share of government funds allocated to 
this sector of the budget; 
(5) The share of education in the budget mirrors 
fairly closely that of total social services, as does the 
share of health. 
(6) The share of social security and welfare ap-
pears less vulnerable to budgetary cutbacks. There is 
a tendency to reduce the share of the budget allocated 
to social security and welfare with increases in the 
debt service share of the budget, but, historically, 
there has also been a secular trend toward an in-
creased share of the government budget to social 
security and welfare. 
(7) The share of housing in the budget has 
not been influenced much by developments in debt 
servicing. However, regime changes, particularly to 
military regimes, have significantly reduced the share 
of the budget allocated to housing. 
(8) The share of the budget allocated to economic 
services follows an interesting pattern. Regressed on 
the share of debt service in the budget, one finds a 
large negative tradeoff as the share of debt service in 
the budget increases. Adding the control variable, 
however, reveals that economic development's share 
of the budget has contracted as a proportion of 
government expenditures as GNP expanded. The 
longer run trend has apparently not been offset with 
political change (the sign is positive on the political 
dummies but none are statistically significant. 
Contrasting the two time periods (Tables 3 and 4) 
reveals more or less the same pattern with regard to 
the handling of debt service. Debt service was not a 
particular problem in the first period (1961-1975), 
with service payments on the government debt not 
reaching a significant share (4.4%) until 1972. As a 
result, the t-values and r 2 are somewhat lower for the 
first period when compared to those of the 1966-1982 
years. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In terms of the questions asked at the beginning of 
this paper, it appears that social services, in general, 
and education and health, in particular, along with 
public administration have borne the brunt of the 
government's rising debt service problem. The social 
sectors have suffered further due to regime changes, 
with military regimes tending to cut back even more 
severely than normal debt service constraints would 
have warranted. 
Other sectors have been negatively affected by the 
debt servicing problem-possibly defense, domestic 
security, social security and welfare-but these 
sectors have found their budgets stabilized, with the 
military regimes inclined to raise their shares in the 
light of mounting debt. 
Defense and economic development appear to be 
largely unaffected by the government's increased debt 
burden. 
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By 1982, debt service was accounting for 37. l % of 
the government budget, up from 22.6% in 1981 and 
16.3% in 1980. Obviously, this trend cannot con-
tinue. Given current levels of external debt, it is fairly 
unlikely that the government will be contracting for 
major net increases in debt in the near term. Given 
this assumption, we can probably expect regime 
changes to play a more assertive role than in the past 
in influencing government budgetary allocations. 
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